In Dynamics of Faith, Paul Tillich writes:
There is no criterion by which faith can be judged from outside the correlation of faith. But something else can happen: The faithful can ask himself or be asked by someone else whether the medium through which he experiences ultimate concern expresses real ultimacy. This question is the dynamic force in the history of religion,
A utopian wonder combined with curiosity and a rigorous skepticism can become the crucible through which we might re-shape our world.
03 May 2012
30 March 2012
The Pairing of "Occupy" and "Wall Street"
It is both curious and subversive that the Occupy Wall Street movement chose “occupy” as its primary term. “Wall Street” is a fairly obvious choice as it represents, it is a synecdoche for, that which the movement opposes. Wall Street is a symbolic space where times and ideologies intersect. “Occupy” primarily signifies
16 March 2012
(Re)Politicizing Theology and (Re)Theologizing Politics
I have recently been venturing more into the realm of political theology, especially in terms of the Occupy movement and the disappointing direction a capitalistic liberal democracy is heading. In response to a post by Adam Kotsko discussing the phrase "spiritual but not religious,"
04 October 2011
Deliberating through Ethical Exaggeration and Hyperbolic Responsibility in the Public Sphere?
How does one articulate, enunciate, or deliberate about an ethic or ethical system without using excessive, exaggerated concepts such as "love" or "alterity?" It seems to me that for a truly beneficial discussion about ethics, one must engage in a practice and language of excess and exaggeration.
07 September 2011
Theological Worlds as rhythms we are all of us enmeshed within
"Obsessio, on the one hand, is the crystallization of deep need around focused imagery so powerful as to become a driving impetus toward satisfaction. Epiphania, on the other hand, is the congealing of those events which so function as hints that they give hopeful contours worthy of wager.
09 August 2011
How subject are we, "ethical subjects," to the Subject (of Ethics)?
"According to the way it is generally used today, the term 'ethics' relates above all to the domain of human rights, 'the rights of man' - or, by derivation, the rights of living beings.
07 July 2011
Interfaith Dialogue Undone?
When I co-founded the Selah Center of the Poncey-Highlands with Dr. Graham Walker, in partnership with Druid Hills Baptist Church in Atlanta, GA, we had high hopes for its successful interaction among religious faiths. As the Director of Interfaith Dialogue and Spiritual Practices I was eager to bring a variety of faith expressions into contact with each other. In many ways, we did begin that process with a Hindu community in the area. We were also able to partner with several artists and art galleries in the community, and we hosted various theatre presentations. We also began a health and wellness program offering yoga and more rigorous "boot camp" classes.
22 June 2011
No Longer Necessary
In his recent article, "Why Liberal Religious Arguments Fail," Peter Laarman argues that it is not argumentation that changes people's minds but stories that change people's hearts. He suggests that endless argumentation is pointless because "hearts change before minds do. It rarely works the other way around." This is not a new position by any means. Rhetoricians have been making this claim for thousands of years. An argument should be constructed "to teach, to please, and to move" as Cicero stated. The issue here is how Laarman is making his point and framing his own argument.
I consider Laarman here to have adopted what Walter Fisher calls the narrative paradigm, and he further makes the assumption that we are meaning-making, story-telling animals, which is all correct. What he fails to do is make a more important connection to argumentative style. There are many different styles of argument, and Laarman lumps them all into one category and casually dismisses them...seemingly in the name of both religion and science. This is not inherently a weak position to take since stories are powerful persuasive tools, but many take this position while making certain other assumptions that are problematic.
Laarman suggests that endless argument gets us nowhere and that we don't even argue to find clarity. He suggests that it's all a win/lose scenario played out for the benefit of our own egos. I agree that this is often the case in our society. However, his own position is quite muddled. Most notably, he argues in the same paragraph that argumentation is an irrational "kink" in truth-seeking while at the same time lauding the defenders of rationality Rawls and Habermas as bastions of "small-scale forums." While this characterization of these two authors is somewhat accurate, it is certainly inconsistent with Laarman's own viewpoint since it is unlikely Rawls or Habermas would put much stock in either religion or story-telling.
The main issue is that Laarman is critiquing only a Western Greco-Roman form of argumentation that does prize a win/lose scenario; an honor/shame system. As we see from the sophistic tradition it is indeed true that humans will often fabricate information to win their case, and we have become quite good at it. On the other hand, argumentation in the more non-Western Jewish and even Eastern rhetorical tradition does not seek winners or losers. Flying directly in the face of Laarman's own argument, the endless argumentation within the Rabbinic tradition, for example, is supposed to bring clarity and, more importantly, wisdom. It will not bring it immediately, but the point is not to possess clarity. It is to keep the conversation open and moving towards a deeper wisdom about the reality of the situation.
I do realize that Laarman is operating within a Western argumentation paradigm, so I will move on. What he actually seems to be suggesting is not that we do away with argumentation outright but that we argue through stories. What he is suggesting is that we steer clear of making our arguments with cold hard facts and temper those with personal anecdotes. Here is where Laarman gets it right. As with Aristotle, Laarman suggests that emotion (pathos) champions logic (logos), which is what many rhetoricians and almost all sophists stated. The problem, however, is not logic, especially since logos is much more closely related to pathos than most people assume. The problem is that we no longer know how to argue. Although we may argue all the time, as Laarman offers, we don't necessarily know how to argue effectively or construct a well-reasoned, well-balanced argument.
The real crux of the issue, then, is that verbal back and forth is not necessarily arguing, which is why it is often unhelpful as Laarman suggests. It passes as arguing, e.g., in political discourse. It may even look like arguing, but it's likely not anything close. Shouting at each other isn't arguing, and neither is presenting a poorly constructed "argument," which leads to endless disagreement and dissatisfaction with a certain issue being addressed. The problem is that these "liberal religious arguments" are passing for arguments when they're actually just an amalgamation of words with facts thrown in to present the appearance of an argument. Yet, it takes skill to craft an argument. It takes the right balance of facts with anecdotes and examples. People's hearts may change before their minds, but their minds are certainly a large part of the equation. Perhaps what is no longer necessary is not argumentation but what is passing as an argument. What is no longer necessary is the appearance of a well-constructed argument that is actually, as Laarman suggests, a complete and utter failure.
I consider Laarman here to have adopted what Walter Fisher calls the narrative paradigm, and he further makes the assumption that we are meaning-making, story-telling animals, which is all correct. What he fails to do is make a more important connection to argumentative style. There are many different styles of argument, and Laarman lumps them all into one category and casually dismisses them...seemingly in the name of both religion and science. This is not inherently a weak position to take since stories are powerful persuasive tools, but many take this position while making certain other assumptions that are problematic.
Laarman suggests that endless argument gets us nowhere and that we don't even argue to find clarity. He suggests that it's all a win/lose scenario played out for the benefit of our own egos. I agree that this is often the case in our society. However, his own position is quite muddled. Most notably, he argues in the same paragraph that argumentation is an irrational "kink" in truth-seeking while at the same time lauding the defenders of rationality Rawls and Habermas as bastions of "small-scale forums." While this characterization of these two authors is somewhat accurate, it is certainly inconsistent with Laarman's own viewpoint since it is unlikely Rawls or Habermas would put much stock in either religion or story-telling.
The main issue is that Laarman is critiquing only a Western Greco-Roman form of argumentation that does prize a win/lose scenario; an honor/shame system. As we see from the sophistic tradition it is indeed true that humans will often fabricate information to win their case, and we have become quite good at it. On the other hand, argumentation in the more non-Western Jewish and even Eastern rhetorical tradition does not seek winners or losers. Flying directly in the face of Laarman's own argument, the endless argumentation within the Rabbinic tradition, for example, is supposed to bring clarity and, more importantly, wisdom. It will not bring it immediately, but the point is not to possess clarity. It is to keep the conversation open and moving towards a deeper wisdom about the reality of the situation.
I do realize that Laarman is operating within a Western argumentation paradigm, so I will move on. What he actually seems to be suggesting is not that we do away with argumentation outright but that we argue through stories. What he is suggesting is that we steer clear of making our arguments with cold hard facts and temper those with personal anecdotes. Here is where Laarman gets it right. As with Aristotle, Laarman suggests that emotion (pathos) champions logic (logos), which is what many rhetoricians and almost all sophists stated. The problem, however, is not logic, especially since logos is much more closely related to pathos than most people assume. The problem is that we no longer know how to argue. Although we may argue all the time, as Laarman offers, we don't necessarily know how to argue effectively or construct a well-reasoned, well-balanced argument.
The real crux of the issue, then, is that verbal back and forth is not necessarily arguing, which is why it is often unhelpful as Laarman suggests. It passes as arguing, e.g., in political discourse. It may even look like arguing, but it's likely not anything close. Shouting at each other isn't arguing, and neither is presenting a poorly constructed "argument," which leads to endless disagreement and dissatisfaction with a certain issue being addressed. The problem is that these "liberal religious arguments" are passing for arguments when they're actually just an amalgamation of words with facts thrown in to present the appearance of an argument. Yet, it takes skill to craft an argument. It takes the right balance of facts with anecdotes and examples. People's hearts may change before their minds, but their minds are certainly a large part of the equation. Perhaps what is no longer necessary is not argumentation but what is passing as an argument. What is no longer necessary is the appearance of a well-constructed argument that is actually, as Laarman suggests, a complete and utter failure.
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